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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STA.TE OF UTAH 
,V. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION 1 
COMP ANY, a- Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE ROAD COM~IIS­
SION ' Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
)\.C~~~~o 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action involves three different claims by the 
General Contractor, W. P. Harlin Construction Com-
pany, appellant, against the Utah State Road Com-
mission, respondent, for three separate breaches of con-
tract, which contracts involve the construction of 
portions of Interstate 15 projects. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
By a Pre-Trial Order (R. 70, 71), the Pre-Tria. 
Judge, the Honorable A. If. Ellett, dismissed the First 
Cause of Action, and set up issues on the Second and 
Third Causes of Action. The First Cause of Action 
relates to the respondent's refusal to permit appellant 
to use appellant's combustion type Del .Mag pile drir-
rng hammer. 
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 73-
81) and to Amend the Pre-Trial Order, was denied 
by the Pre-Trial Judge. ( R. 86) . A Petition for Inter-
mediate Appeal was denied by this Supreme Court. 
Appellant, on October 18, 1966, filed its .Motion 
to Amend Pre-Trial Order and to Permit Trial of the 
First Cause of Action. ( R. 90) . These Motions were 
to be argued at the beginning of the trial. These Mo-
tions also sought permission to make a proffer of proof 
on the First Cause of Action. 
These l\f otions were argued prior to trial and were 
denied by the trial court. The Second and Third Causes 
of Action were thereupon tried to a jury, a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff in the full amounts on both 
causes was rendered, and judgment entered accord· 
ingly and satisfied. Said judgment also dismissed the 
First Cause of Action, denied appellants' Motion to 
Amend the Pre-Trial Order, to Permit the First Cause 
of Action to be tried, and to make a proffer of proof; 
and, said judgment also affirmed the Pre-Trial Order. 
(R. 127, 128). 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant herein seeks reversal of the dismissal 
of the First Cause of Action, and a remand to the Dis-
trict Court for trial of the issues in the First Cause of 
Action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as appellant's First Cause of Action was 
dismissed as a matter of law by the Pre-Trial Judge 
and the trial court denied appellant the right to make 
a proffer of proof, there is no evidence to support any 
facts. Therefore, the facts set forth herein should be 
accepted as alleged in the plaintiffs' various pleadings, 
and considered m a light most favorable to plaintiff-
appellant. 
The facts set forth herein, therefore, are taken 
for the most part from the pleadings. A more complete 
factual picture is shown in the various Motions and 
affi<lavits. (R. 53, 51, 65, 73, 82), but obviously much 
detailed evidence to support the ultimate facts would 
only be developed at trial or upon proffer of proof. 
Harlin, appellant herein, entered into a contract 
for the construction of Interstate 15 overpass struc-
tures at 2nd South and 8th \Vest Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R. 1). Pilings had to be driven to support 
the foundations for these overpass structures. The 
methods of driving the pilings, as well as the type of 
pile driving hammer allowed are set forth in certain 
specifications. (R. 7, 9). 
3 
The special provisions of the specifications modified, 
the general condition by establishing the minimum 
energy rating of 18,000-foot pounds per blow. 
' 
The general conditions provided that a cumbustion' 
type hammer could be used. This proviso is stated, as 
follows: 
"Combustion-type pile hammers may be used ' 
in lieu of air or steam hammers; providing a 
rating (energy per blow) mutually agreed upon 
by the Contractor and the Chief Structural En· 
gineer is established prior to use." 
Appellant owned a combustion-type hammer 
known as a Del l\iag D-12, with a rating in excess of 
18,000-foot pounds per blow and which complied with 
I 
specifications in every respect. The appellant entered 1 
into the contract and submitted its bid in reliance upon 
the specifications and upon the contemplated use of , 
this D-12 Hammer on the project. (R. 9, 10). The 
respondent refused to permit the use of the D-12 Ham- , 
mer, thus requiring appellant to obtain a much larger 
combustion-type hammer at additional cost. Appellant · 
thereupon claimed in its Complaint (R. 9), in its claims 
at the Pre-Trial (R. 70, 71), and in its Motion for 
1 
Reconsideration (R. 73-81), as follows: , 
1. That it submitted its bid and was awarded 
the contract in reliance upon the said specification 
and upon its use of the D-12 Hammer in accord-
ance therewith. 
2. That the hammer did have more than the 
4 
minimum rating of 18,000-foot pounds per blow, 
and that it complied with and could comply with 
the specifications relating to pile driving. 
3. That it further relied upon the fact that the 
State, under identical specifications for the con-
struction of Interstate structures at 21st South 
Street immediately prior to the subject contract, 
had agreed to the rating of the D-12 Hammer, had 
permitted and accepted its use throughout said 
project through the same Structural Engineer as 
was employed upon the subject project, and with 
a Contractor, Tolboe & Harlin Construction Com-
pany, in which the same W. P. Harlin was a part-
ner and involved in the pile driving work on the 
project and with which the plaintiff was in privity; 
that the State knew that appellant would use and 
had anticipated using the same D-12 Hammer on 
the subject project, but had made no complaint 
as to its use nor change in the specifications until 
after the project had storted. 
4. That the State breached the contract by 
arbitrarily, unreasonably and without any cause 
refusing to agree to the use of the hammer even 
though the hammer complied in all respect with 
the specifications and could readily have performed 
the required work. 
5. That the State arbitrarily disregarded the 
energy rating requirement of the aforesaid specifi-
cation, and required appellant to submit its D-12 
5 
Hammer to a test entirely beyond and unrelated 
to the requirements of the specifications, which test . 
was inadequate, inconclusive, incompetent and ' 
incorrect as a basis for refusing the use of the D-12 
1 
Hammer, and which test still showed that the D-19 ! 
• I 
Hammer did comply with the specifications, and 1 
that this was a breach of the contract. 
6. That had a proper test been made, the D-12 
Hammer would have been shown to comply with 
the specifications; and, that as a matter of fact, I 
the same D -12 Hammer was permitted to be used : 
after the test, back on the same 21st South project ' 
on which it had been originally used. 
7. That the State was equitably estopped from 
ref using to accept the hammer and had waived its ' 
right to reject the hammer. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint and the 
Answer, various Interrogatories and Answers thereto 
were filed; ( R. 27, 142, 146, 44) depositions were 
taken (R. 39, 43) and various Motions filed and denied 
(R. 13, 14) until the matter came on for Pre-Trial 
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett. 
The Pre-Trial Order was entered m which the 
Court summarily and incompletely stated claims of the 
plaintiff (R. 70, 71), and then held as a matter of law: 
"That the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on 
the First Cause of Action and that the claims of 
the plaintiff as to arbitrariness in ref using t.o 
agree on the rating of the hammer is not suff1· 
6 
~d 
st . 
1d 
cient to permit the plaintiff to recover even 
though the hammer may have had 22,500-foot 
pounds of energy." 
l2 i The Court further stated, on the question of arbitrari-
l2 i ness, that: 
td I 
l2 
th 
~t. I 
~d : 
ct ' 
"In Interrogatory No. 3 of Set 2, the plaintiff 
admits that it had nothing to show by way of 
arbitrariness of the defendant in refusing to 
agree on the rating of the hammer, except that 
the hammer had been used on another job py 
partners, one of which is the chief stockholder 
of the plaintiff corporation." 
Thereafter, appellant filed its Motion for Recon-
sideration, claiming that the Pre-Trial Order would 
m · result in manifest injustice and seeking to amend the 
ts ~ Pre-Trial Order in order to submit the matter to the 
trier of the facts. (R. 73-81). This Motion was denied 
1e without hearing by a minute entry, dated July 26, 
to 1966, (R. 73), and thereafter by a formal Order, signed 
re September 1, 1966. (R. 86). 
~d 
al 
lie 
he 
JD 
of 
to 
fi· 
A Demand for Jury Trial was filed and appellant 
filed its Motion to Amend Pre-Trial Order and to Per-
mit Trial of the First Cause of Action. (R. 90, 91). 
These Motions, including therein appellant's motion to 
make a proffer of proof, were denied just prior to the 
trial. (R. 127-129). Jury trial on the other two causes 
was had. This appeal is thereupon taken from Judg-
ment denying Trial of First Cause. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
PRE - TRIAL ORDER DIS.MISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACT] 
A. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ES 
LISHING AS ISSUES OF FACT AN1 
LAW THE DEFENDANT'S ALLE 
BREACH OF THE CONTRACT. 
The Pre-Trial Court, in dismissing the First 
of Action, disregarded the clear issues of fact ar 
relating to the question of breach of contract l 
respondent. The purpose of a Pre-Trial is to for1 
the issues. As stated in 3 Moore, Federal Pract 
Page 1116: 
"It should be noted that the formulation 
issues under Rule 16 is essentially a tri-
ma tter between the parties and the con: 
rule providing that the Pre-Trial Ordei 
limit the issues for trial to those not dispc 
by admissions or agreements of counsel 
court should not impose on the parties i1 
views of what the issues are." 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, p1 
for a Pre-Trial procedure and the formulation of 
thereby. As is indicated in the last paragraph 
rule, the court should make an Order which lim 
issues to those not disposed of by admissions or 
men ts. 
8 
In this case, there are many issues of fact and law, 
and none of them were disposed of by any admissions 
' or agreements of the parties. 
There were factual issues relating to the question 
of whether or not the State followed the provisions of 
, the specifications in testing and thereafter rejecting 
the appellant's D-12 Hammer; there were factual 
issues relating to the question of estoppel on the part 
of the State to refuse to accept the D-12 Hammer; 
, there were factual issues relating to whether or not 
' the State had in fact agreed to the use of the hammer; 
there were factual issues as to whether or not the State 
had exceeded the specification provisions relating to 
' agreement as to the energy rating; and, there were 
factual issues relating to the arbitrary and unreason-
able action of the State in testing the D-12 Hammer, 
and in the refusal to permit the use of the hammer even 
before the test results were known, notwithstanding 
the results of the test. All of these factual issues were 
ignored by the Pre-Trial Order, and notwithstanding 
the lack of evidence, exhibits or trial in any way of 
these issues, the Court determined that the First Cause 
of Action could be dismissed as a matter of law. 
It is clear that the above matters are questions of 
fact or mixed questions of law and fact and are, there-
fore, within the province of the trier of the fact. In 
this case, the trier of the fact was a jury, and appellant 
was denied a trial by jury. 
9 
Again, as stated in Moore, Federal Practice, Page 
1117: 
"It is fair to say that while parties should 
normally be held to admissions carefully and sol-
emnly made, on the other hand the Pre-Trial 
Order must not be an inexorable decree. It is 
defined to promote litigation on the merits, and 
a Pre-Trial must not, of course, be used to 
thwart its very objective." 
This Pre-Trial Order has clearly eliminated the 
main issues in the case. It certainly is contrary to the 
intent of Rule 16. 
B. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER IN CONCLUDING FROM THE 
ANS,VER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3, 
SET NO. 2, THAT APPELLANT HAD 
NOTHING TO SHO'V BY WAY OF ARBI-
TRARINESS, EXCEPT THE CONTEN-
TION THAT THE HAl\1.MER HAD BEEN 
USED ON ANOTHER PROJECT. 
An examination of the particular Interrogatories 
(R. 146) and the Answer thereto, (R. 44, 45) indicates 
the following question: 
3. "What facts evidence proposed tests or sug-
gestions did the plaintiff present to def en~ant 
to show that plaintiff's Del Mag D-12 D1e.sel 
Hammer, and possess the energy rating which 
plaintiff claimed." 
The answer to that interrogatory is, as follows: 
10 
3. "Nothing was presented at that particular 
time, other than the fact that the defendant had 
approved the use of another job and the fact 
that the manufacturer had made this particular 
rating." 
The question and answer indicate clearly that no 
arbitrariness or unreasonableness is being discussed or 
even contemplateq. The question simply asks the plain-
tiff to tell what facts, evidence, proposed tests, or sug-
gestions were presented to the defendant to demonstrate 
the energy rating of the D-12 Hammer. The answer 
given relates to the particular time of making the 
test and indicates that two evidences of the energy rating 
were stated, i.e., the prior approval of use on another 
job, and the fact that the manufacturer had made 
the rating. The arbitrariness involved in this First 
Cause of Action has to do with many other facts than 
with the actual rating of the hammer. The actions of 
the State leading up to the test, the actions of the 
State during the test, as well as the subsequent actions 
of the State after the test in its disregard of the energy 
rating, are facts relating to arbitrariness. Further-
more, the State admitted and recognized that the D-12 
Hammer had a proper rating (R. 49), and further 
recognized that the testing was not for the purpose 
of determining the rating, but was made merely to 
compare the appellant's D-12 Hammer with some other 
hammer furnished by appellant's competitor (R. 55), 
which latter hammer was in no way comparable to 
appellant's hammer. 
11 
The Court misinterprets the interrogatory and 
answer thereto in stating that the appellant "admits 
it had nothing to show by way of arbitrariness ... 
except that the hammer had been used on another job 
by partners ... " Obviously, the answer does not so : 
admit, but it also states, and this the Court ignores, 
that appellant informed respondent of the actual manu-
facturer's rating. The answer also limits the question to 
the actual conducting of the test. In appellant's Motion 1. 
for Reconsideration, the facts leading up to the test 
are set forth in Paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), 
(h), (i) and (j). (R. 74-77). 
The same Answers to Interrogatories indicate other i 
facts upon which the appellant relied to show the arbi-
1 
trary actions of the State. It is not fair nor accurate 
to isolate Answer No. 3 and give it the broad effect 
which the trial court did to the complete disregard 
of the other Answers to Interrogatories. The Inter· 
rogatory and the Answer thereto upon which the trial 
court relies simply has nothing to do with an admis· 
sion as to lack of arbitrariness. It states simply that 
at the time of the test, appellant informed respondent 
that it had already used the hammer on a prior job, 
which was accepted by the State, and that the rating 1 
of the hammer complied with the specifications. As 
appellant set forth in its Motion for Reconsideration, 
the State was well aware of the problems relating to 
the testing it was going to undertake and was well aware 
of the inadequacies of this testing and of the fact that 
it did not comply with the requirements of the speci· 
12 
fieations. In no way can it be said that the appellant 
admitted that the only evidence of arbitrariness was 
the rating of the hammer and the fact that it was used 
on the prior job. 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF COULD NOT RECOVER ON THE 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The Pre-Trial Court, in its Order, held: 
"as a matter of law that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover on the First Cause of Ac-
tion." ( R. 71) . 
This determination puts in issue the sufficiency of the 
appellant's claims much in the same fashion as does 
a Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, all of the allegations 
of the Complaint and Amended Complaint must be 
taken as true. The Court thus in effect states that the 
First Cause of Action does not state a proper claim 
against the defendant. This determination is in error. 
The elements of the allegations should be considered 
anJ are summarized, as follows: 
ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLEADINGS 
(a) That Harlin and the State entered into 
the construction contract. (R. I). 
( b) That the contract contained the following 
G-eneral Condition: 
13 
"Combustion-type pile hammers may be used 
in lieu of air or steam hammers, providing a rat-
ing (energy per blow) mutually agreed upon by 
the Contractor and the Chief Structural Engi-
neer is established prior to use." 
The contract also contains the Special Provisions 
that the minimum energy rating for a hammer shall 
be 18,000-foot pounds per blow. (R. 9). 
( c) That Harlin bid and was awarded the 
contract in reliance upon said specifications and 
upon using its D-12 combustion hammer, which 
hammer had an energy ratnig of more than the 
required 18,000-foot pounds per blow, i.e., 22,500 
foot pounds per blow; and, that said hammer did 
and would comply with specifications. (R. 9, 35). 
(d) That the State breached the contract by 
not fallowing the above specification, and deter· 
mining the energy rating, but by adding another 
test not provided for in the specifications, to-wit, 
a test made to compare the driving ability of the 
D-12 hammer with another type hammer, and by 
requiring the driving ability of the D-12 hammer 
with another type hammer, and by requiring the 
plaintiff to use a combustion-type hammer with 
an energy rating of 39,500-foot pounds per blow, 
this exceeding the specification rating of 18,000· 
foot pounds. (R. 2, 9). 
( e) That the State further breached the con· 
tract by arbitrarily, improperly, knowingly and 
14 
willfully disregarding the energy rating of the 
D-12 Hammer and rejecting the hammer based 
upon an inaccurate and inconclusive test which 
neither determined the energy rating nor in any 
way determined the capability or incapability of 
the D-12 Hammer to meet the specifications, and 
which test was initiated and carried out by appel-
lant's competitor. (R. 9). 
() f That Harlin also relied upon the fact 
that the State had previously agreed to the 18,000 
rating and to the use of the D-12 Hammer on 
the subject project, in accordance with the said 
General Condition; that Harlin had, theref ore1 
complied with the specification, and that the State 
had breached the specification by not permitting 
the use of the D-12 Hammer. 
(g) That in the absence of a specific agree-
ment, the State was estopped to deny the use of 
the hammer by reason of the fact that the same 
hammer had been used and acceped upon the 21st 
South project by the State immediately prior to 
the letting of the subject contract under the same 
General Conditions and Special Provisions, with 
the same Chief Engineer for the State, upon a 
similar project and with the Tolboe & Harlin 
Construction Company, with which there was 
privity down to the plaintiff and appellant herein; 
and, that the State had knowingly maintained the 
same General Conditions and Special Provisions, 
15 
and had known that the same hammer would be I 
used on the subject project. 
i 
(h) That the State had waived the require· : 
ment that the used of the hammer be agreed to. 
(R.2.9). 
The foregoing allegations more than adequately 
state a claim for a breach of contract by the State under 
the following principles of law: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The General Condition set forth in (b) above, : 
permits use of the hammer, if the hammer has the , 
proper energy rating and if the rating is agreed to I 
by the State. The Special Provision modifies the Gen-
eral conditions and sets the minimum rating for the 
hammer at 18,000-foot pounds per blow. The Con-
tractor is entitled to rely upon this specification and 
upon the conditions imposed therein governing the use 
of the hammer, to-wit, the agreement as to the energy 
rating. Although it certainly may be argued that the 
Special Provision modifies the General Condition and 
establishes the rating for purpose of the agreement 
and in effect eliminates the necessity of an agreement, 
except as to a determination of the actual rating of 
the hammer itself. Wunderlich vs. United States, ex 
rel Reischell-Cottrell, 240 Fed. 2d 20 ( C.C.A. Tenth). 
Even though the specification is permissive, it is a 
representation upon which the Contractor may rely. 
16 
F. H. McGraw vs. United States, 82 Fed. Supp. 338; 
and, Johnson vs. United States, 153 Fed. 2d 846. 
Here, the State allegedly (R. 44) and admittedly 
(R. 55, 142) was not testing the energy rating, but 
was instead imposing another test-one of comparison 
as to the ability of the two hammers to penetrate a 
dense strata of ground. This was a condition outside 
of the specifications and an attempt to impose into the 
problem the Chief Engineer's opinion, thus constitut-
ing a clear breach of the contract. 
In Midgley vs. Campbell Building Company, 38 
Utah 293, 112 Pac. 820, this very question was before 
our court. In that case, the contractor was required to 
furnish goods "in each case in strict accordance with 
the plans and specifications." However, the Architect 
rejected the goods upon another basis. The court held 
that this was arbitrary and was a breach of the contract, 
and that the goods would have to be rejected for failure 
to comply with the specifications, and not for failure 
to comply with some other requirement. 
In Davies vs. Kahn, 251 Fed. 2d 324, the court held 
to the same effect and stated: 
"Unless authorized by the contract, an Archi-
tect has no inherent power to insist on an article 
of particular manufacture not specified in the 
contract over one that in all respects responds 
to the contract." 
In United States vs. Adams, 160 Fed. Supp. 143, 
358 Fed. 2d 986, the Government Inspector required 
17 
the Contractor to perform tests beyond those called for 
in the specifications. The court recognized the right VJ 
inspect, but held that: 
"The inspections were arbitrary and not in 
conformity with the procedures and requirements 
as set forth in the agreed inspection plan." 
Judgment was granted in favor of the contractor. 
It is clear, therefore, that even without any arbi-
trariness on the part of the State, the deliberate use 
of a test not required or provided for in the specifica-
tions and exceeding that set forth in the specifictions, 
constitutes a breach of the contract as a matter of law. 
Even in a case where the specifications do not establish 
the criteria for determining the operative fiitness, our 
court, in H ayrnore vs. LeviMon, 8 Utah 2d 66, 3~8 
Pac. 2d 307, has held that: 
"The better considered view, and the one we 
adhere to, is that the party favored by such a pro· 
vision has no arbitrary privilege of declining to 
acknowledge satisfaction .... " 
In Volume 3 of McBride & Wachtel, Government 
Contracts, Law-Administration-Procedure, at Para· 
graph 27.40, the writers state that: 
"With respect to the impropriety of an in· 
spection, a failure on the Government's part to 
conduct an inspection or test in exact accorda~ce 
with the contract specifications, makes that m· 
spection unreasonable." 
Numerous Armed Services Board of Contract Appeal 
cases are cited in support thereof. See also New York 
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,1Iarket Gardners Association vs. United States, 43 
Ct. Cls. 114; Heid Bros., Inc. vs. United States, 69 
Ct. Cls. 704; and, Lamport Manufacturing Supply 
Company vs. United States, 65 Ct. Cls. 579. 
Therefore, allegations either of the arbitrary or 
unreasonable refusal to agree, or allegations of the 
imposition of different tests than those provided for 
in the specifications are sufficient as a matter of law 
for a proper cause of action. At the very least, the 
allegations raise questionse of fact as to the arbitrary 
or unreasonable actions of the State. 
'i\T AIVER OF CONDITIONS 
Obviously, the State can waive a condition of the 
contract. Appellant has alleged such a waiver and such 
an allegation alone or in conjunction with a claim of 
estoppel is sufficient. See New York Market Gardners 
Association v. U.S., supra; and McBride-Wachtel, 
supra, Par. 27.40. 
PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE STATE 
There is an allegation that the State had agreed 
upon and had accepted the use of the D-12 combustion 
harruner. If there is a prior agreement, then, of course, 
the State berached the contract by refusing to honor the 
condition which has been complied with by the Con-
tractor. Obviously, evidence should be taken in con-
nection with such an allegation of a prior agreement. 
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EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
Inasmuch as the Special Provisions establish a 
minimum energy rating of 18,000-foot pounds per blow, 
that Special Provision takes precedence over the Gen-
eral Condition which established the need for the parties 
to agree upon a rating. H ollerback vs. United States, 
233 U. S. 165; and, Erickson vs. United States, 107 
Fed. 204 (C.C.A. 9th). It certainly is reasonable to 
contend that no agreement was required. This conten-
tion is substantiated by the actual facts: 
On the 21st South project, (R. 2, 10, 17 and 34) 
there was no specific agreement signed. However, the 
same D-12 hammer was used by the Contractor, wa~ 
accepted by and approved by the State throughout 
the entire project, and in fact was accepted and ap-
proved by the State when the hammer was returned 
to that 21st South project after it had been wrongfully 
rejected on the subject 2_roject. (R. 65, 73-75, 78). As 
further indication of the waiver of the express agree· 
ment, appellant, when forced to obtain a new and larger 
Del Mag combustion hammer, used it on the subject 
job with the State's acceptance but without testing or 
without specific agreement by the State prior to use. 
Thus, the State, both under the allegations and under 
the general facts which would be shown m support 
thereof, had waived the requirement of an express 
agreement. 
However, in addition to the foregoing waiver and 
in expansion thereof, the State, under the Doctrine of 
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Equitable Estoppel, cannot deny the use of the D-12 
combustion hammer. The State knew of the use and 
the acceptance of the D-12 and its rating of 18,-
000-f'oot pounds per blow or more under the same 
General Conditions and the same Special Provision 
on the 21st South structure project. All conditions 
were identical to the subject problem, excepting that 
the contractor on the 21st South project was legally 
a different entity, but practically the same. In any 
event, there was privity between the Contractor on 
the 21st South job and the Contractor on the subject 
job through dissolution of the Tolboe & Harlin Con-
struction Company partnership entity and transfer of 
assets, including the D-12 hammer to appellant. (R. 
73, 74, 83). 
The general rule as developed in the dissent in 
State vs. Northwest Magnesite Company, 182 Pac. 
2d 543, is that: 
"A Governmental agency may be estopped, 
as right and justice may require, where the act 
or contract relied on to create the estoppel was 
within its corporate powers, although the method 
of exercising the power was irregular or un-
authorized." (Citing 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, par. 
144). 
The principle of equitable estoppel is followed in 
l'tah and is enunciated in various cases, such as: Tanner 
)is. Provo Reservoir Company, 76 Utah 335, 344; I.X.L. 
Stores vs. Succe.r;s Markets, 98 Utah 160, 166; Kelly 
vs. Rfrhards, 95 Utah 560; and, Union Tank Car Com-
pa11.1; z1s. TVheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101. 
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The plaintiff-appellant herein can take advantagt 
of this estoppel even though it is legally and technicalh 
a different entity, since estoppel enures to the beneti.i 
of those in privity. 19 Am. Jur., Page 809. But eve
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privity is unnecessary, if the one making the repre. 
sentations knows or should have known that the othe1 
party will rely thereon. 31 C.J.S., Paragraph 130. 
The facts, as to whether or not the necessary elemenh 
of estoppel exist are, of course, for the trier of the facts. 
in this case the jury, to determine. Albers vs. fo 
Angeles County, 398 Pac. 2d 129. 
Many facts exist in support of the theory ol 
estoppel, and the facts are set out in part in the Memo· 
randa ( R. 83, 84 ) and in the J\ifotion for Reconsidera· 
tion. (R. 73-75). However, the allegations are suffi· 
cient and this issue, both as a matter of law and of fact. 
should have been retained in the First Cause of Action. 
Therefore, we can only conclude that the allega· 
tions of the :First Cause of Action state a claim on 
several different theories. The trial court in its Pre· 
Trial Order and thereafter at the trial, summarily 
disposed of the First Cause of Action without properly 
taking into account the legal bases for the cause and 
without considering many facts relating thereto. By 
this summary disposition, the appellant was effective!~· 
prevented from having his day in court. Under the law 
and under the facts also as they would have been <le· 
veloped, plaintiff was entitled at the very least to a trial 
on the issues. Under the law cited above, howerer. 
22 
appellant would have been entitled to a judgment of 
liability against the State as a matter of law upon the 
breach of contract theory. 
D. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE 
CLAIMS OF ARBITRARINESS WERE 
INSUFFICIENT. 
The very statement of the holding indicates its 
error. The arbitrary disregard of the specifications is 
as a matter of law sufficient to permit recovery on 
the part of the plaintiff-appellant. The cases cited above 
clearly so hold. 
Furthermore, the court's conclusion that the claims 
were not sufficient as a matter of law are contradictory 
to the statement of the claim in the Pre-Trial Order. 
There is no evidence nor any legal basis for determin-
ing that the claim of arbitrariness is insufficient. The 
Court only relies in some fashion upon the alleged 
admission found in the answer to Interrogatory No. 
3 of Set No. 2. However, such a reliance is so plainly 
erroneous when the actual interrogatory and its answer 
are read, that even that has no basis whatsoever as 
an admisson. Furthermore, the State recognized (R. 
55) that it was not concerned with the energy rating, 
but only with comparing the D-12 with the Raymond 
hammer. Thus, the answer to the interrogatory, which 
nwrely states that the plaintiff-appellant informed the 
State of the rating at the time of the test, does not 
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limit the arbitrary action of the State, but instead, 
adds to it. However, it is clear that other events leaa 
up to the test, including meetings on June 3 and 
again on June 7th. ( R. 73-81; letter of June 13, 1961' 
from Harlin to the Project Engineer). The additionai 
bases for arbitrariness are set forth in Answers to 
Interrogatories furnished by the plaintiff-appellant: 
( R. 44) in Aff ida vi ts by the plaintiff; ( R. 53, 54/ 
and in Answers to Interrogatories of the subject Set 
No. 2. (R. 44, 45). Thus, at the very least, the Pre·i 
Trial Court had before it many factual statemenh ~ 
·which precluded any determination as a matter of law 
that the admission limited the arbitrariness claimed b: 
plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S .MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIOX 
AND AMENDlVIENT OF THE PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER. 
After rece1vmg the aforesaid Pre-Trial Order. 
appellant immediately filed a Motion for Reconsidera· 
tion, setting out in considerable detail the different 
facts and issues which substantiate the ultimate issues: 
raised in the pleadings. The court's refusal to amenJ 
the Pre-Trial Order resulted in manifest injustice ann 
was contrary to the spirit and intent of Rule 16 con· 
cerning the Pre-Trial Orders, and also Rule 15 relating 
to the amendment of pleadings. 
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The courts uniformly have considered the Pre-
Trial Order Rules and the Amendment of Pleadings 
Rule as related in the effectuating of justice in our 
judicial system. Amendments to the pleadings and to 
the Pre-Trial Orders are generally granted so that the 
parties can go to trial on meritorious issues. Hancock 
vs. Lulce, 46 U. 26, 38. Especially is this so where the 
Pre-Trial Order does not reflect the contentions of 
the parties. In Calvin vs. West Coast Power Company, 
(Ore.) ( 1941 ) 2 F .R.D. 248, the court held: 
""\Vhere the Pre-Trial Order does not properly 
reflect the contention of the parties, it may be 
set aside before the trial and a new conference 
ordered." 
Again, in King vs. Edward Hines Lumber Com-
pany, 68 Fed. Supp. 1019, 1021, the court stated: 
"Permission has not been denied the counsel 
in cases where Pre-Trial Conferences were held, 
to change the form of an admission or even its 
substance before the final crystalization of the 
Pre-Trial Order.'' 
Here, our Pre-Trial Order, contrary to the usual 
practice, gave no period within which the parties could 
object thereto. Appellant had only one means to 
attempt to amend the June 23rd Pre-Trial Order in 
order to properly set out the issues, and that was its 
Motion for Reconsideration, filed July 6. (R. 73-
81). 
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In McDowall vs. Orr Felt & Blanket Comp1rnJ c 
146 Fed. 2<l 13G, the court, in reversing the refusal o: n 
the trial court to amend the pleadings in order to se· 
up additional facts, considered Rules 15 and 16 a· 
compatible, and stated: 
"To permit the submission of the actual facb. 
or what is contended to be the actual facts of tht 
present controversy, is here required for a jus! 
disposition of the case, and leave to amend sh~ula 
have been grau ted." 
Again, in the annotation at 22 A.L.R. 2d 613, the 
annotator states: 
"The courts manifest an inclination to gran\ 
or deny an amendment on a Pre-Trial Order 
on much the same grounds and conditions m' 
those influencing the granting or denial of mo· 
tions to amend the pleadings." 
In Maryland Casualty Company vs. Reichenmaker. 
146 Fed. 2d 75, the court reversed the trial courb 
refusal to permit the injection of new issues where the 
parties had stipulated to a contrary fact situation. The 
court therein held that the spirit of the exception to 
Rule 16 concerning the modification of the Pre-Trial 
Order at the trial to prevent manifest injustice, was 
consistent with Rule 15 (a), providing that lea Ye to 
file amended pleadings would be freely given when' 
justice so requires. 
In our own court in Reich vs. Christopulous, 123 
Utah 137, the issues at the trial exceeded those in the 
Pre-Trial Order, and an amendment of the Pre-Trial 
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Order was permitted. This court cited Rule 15, per-
mitting amendment of the pleadings, and stated: 
''It would be anomalous if the pleadings could 
be so amended but the Pre-Trial Order could 
not . . . the amendment was equivalent to an 
amendment to conform to the evidence. The 
trial court did that which was necessary and 
proper to effectuate justice." 
In Miles vs. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
158 Fed. 2d 326, the issue was whether the deceased 
was an employee or not. The plaintiff had asked for 
a jury, but had agreed to certain facts subject to 
reserving the rights of each party to introduce additional 
eYidence. The trial court was held to have improperly 
denied these issues as a matter of law, but should have 
proceeded to trial on the facts. 
The Pre-Trial Court and Trial Court has thus 
effectively prevented any amendments to the pleadings, 
and turned the Pre-Trial into a summary judgment 
proceeding without proper notice, or legal factual basis. 
This has deprived appellant of a substantial right to 
trial and is manifestly without justice. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF ITS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. 
The issue of performance of a contract or com-
pliance with the specifications is factual. The issue of 
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arbitrariness is likewise factual. 13 Am. J ur. 2d, Pa1 
129, and 54 A.L.R. 1268. The existence of the elemen(1 
of equitable estoppel also involves a determination 01 
facts. Albers v. Los Anyeles County, supra. 
It is true that at the time of the Pre-Trial Order, 
a Demand for Jury had not been made, but it is alsu. 
true that at the time plaintiff-appellant moved to amena 
the Pre-Trial Order and to include the First Caust 
of Action in the trial of the case, a Demand for Jur) 
had been filed, and the case was to have been tried b)·i 
a Jury. 
Under Rule 38, Utah R1tles of Civil Procedure, 
and under the many cases decided by this court, includ·. 
ing James Manufacturing Company vs. Wilson, l.i1 
Utah 2d 210, 390 Pac. 2d 127; Holland vs. Wiuon. 
8 Utah 2d 11, 327 Pac. 2d 250; and Finlayson vi. 
Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 Pac. 2d 491, a party is en· 
titled to a jury trial. 
In order to preserve the record and to give thi) 
Appellate Court the facts upon which it could properly 
and intelligently determine whether or not the plaintiff· 
appellant had a proper claim, the appellant sought to 
make a proffer of proof before the trial. This proffer 
was denied and such denial is prejudicial to appellant, 
and is substantial error. It has prevented appellanl 
from properly presenting this appeal record. 
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SUMMARY 
Appellant Harlin, through the summary disposi-
tion of the First Cause of Action at the Pre-Trial stage, 
the summary denial of the right to amend the Pre-
Trial Order by the Pre-Trial Judge, the further denial 
of the Trial Judge to permit amendment of the Pre-
Trial Order, and the denial of the right to try the First 
Cause of Action, together with the denial of the right 
to make a proffer of proof, have resulted in extreme 
and manifest injustice to appellant. Legally, as the 
citations show, he has a good cause of action against 
the defendant. Factually, he can support and prove 
under the required burden of proof the allegations set 
forth in his pleadings. It is, therefore, equitable and 
just, as well as legally proper, for this Court to permit 
a trial upon the issues in the First Cause of Action. 
To this end, appellant respectfully requests that the 
Orders of the Pre-Trial Judge and the Trial Judge 
be reversed, that the proffer be allowed, and that the 
First Cause of Action be set down for trial in the 
District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
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